mit milder punishment of white-collar crimes than deserved-though harsher than currently practiced-as well as less severe punishment of violent crimes: "since utilitarian goals are not being achieved by putting common criminals in prison [they] can [be] set free." Indeed, "most criminals" should be given "community treatment" instead of prison. This would bring about "convergence toward an egalitarian situation where both rich and poor are punished less than they deserve." The greater equality between punishments for the two types of crime would produce more justice and more utility.
(1) Braithwaite seems aware that what he describes as "just deserts" theory, and attributes with some justice to Andrew von Hirsch, is actually a popular consensus theory. However, he ignores this in his argument. With minor qualifications according to Braithwaite, the theory he calls "just deserts" suggests that punishment should be determined by popular surveys corrected for consistency. Quite possibly, this is what retributionism amounts to in practice. Indeed, all theories of punishment may be unlikely to avoid such a practical outcome in a democracy. But neither retributionist theory nor any other would justify such an outcome. And the purpose of all theories of punishment is to justify it independently of popular consensus. Even utilitarian theories rely on utility rather than on popular consensus. Retributionist theories want justice done and do not confuse it with popular consensus.
Braithwaite himself means to justify and prescribe basing himself on popular consensus and egalitarianism. But I see no utilitarian basis for his prescription although he does. Even if one discounts all theoretical pretensions and simply interprets Baithwaite's argument to mean that white-collar criminals ought to be punished more severely because people want them to be, his further conclusion does not follow. For as Braithwaite realizes, it is impracticable to increase the severity of punishment to the levels people thought appropriate in surveys. Yet decreasing the severity of the punishment of common criminals, as Braithwaite proposes, is certainly not what the majority of people want, according to the very surveys he cites. Hence, his proposal cannot be justified by consensus or utilitarian theory any more than by just deserts theory.
One may attack retributionism for not being helpful in telling us what justice actually does require; but one cannot attack it on the ground Braithwaite chooses, that it should follow popular preference and that to do so would be impracticable. There is nothing in retributionionist theory to require it to follow popular perceptions of desert.
(2) The surveys Braithwaite discusses are not concerned with popular perceptions of what the just desert for any crime may be. None of the questions and answers quoted indicate inquiries about just deserts.
For all we know, every survey respondent may have thought of the seriousness of the crimes and the appropriate punishments about which he was questioned entirely in terms of deterrence. In that case the surveys would tell us something about the popular perception of the need for deterrence and not for retributive punishment. The surveys would reveal nothing even about the popular perception of just deserts. Now, in fact we do not know what criteria were used by which proportion of respondents. They tell about the punishments they feel desirable. We don't know whether they think these punishments desirable because deserved, or deterrent, or rehabilitative. It follows that the respondents' evaluation of white-collar crimes would not be binding on retributionist theory--even if that theory were based on popular perceptions.
(3) Braithwaite argues as well that white-collar crimes deserve punishment according to retributionist theory because they do more harm than other crimes. Harm done is indeed an element in the retributionist theory of punishment, provided that individual guilt for it can be shown. But harm is no more decisive for retributionist than for utilitarian theory. Relying on harm, Braithwaite risks showing that it is utilitarian theory rather than the theory of just desert which demands an impracticably severe punishment for white-collar crime. In utilitarian theory the harm to be avoided by means of deterrence plays a large role in determining punishment; whereas just desert theory looks to harm done only, and only as an element which helps to determine the wickedness which deserves punishment.
(4) Many of the white-collar crimes Braithwaite discusses can be punished only by accepting a strict liability doctrine. Retributionism does not. It cannot therefore demand any punishment, let alone a severe one, for these acts although Braithwaite argues that it must. Not retributionist but deterrent theory may at times dispense with the showing of individual culpability.
(5) In many of the white-collar crimes Braithwaite discusses criminal remedies seem altogether inappropriate (not in all: there is no other remedy for bribery or other white-collar crimes which may not victimize specifiable individuals or groups. But in these, individual guilt usually can be shown). Tort remedies (which should be streamlined) seem more effective and more just, consistent with both utilitarian and retributionist theories. White-collar crimes are usually committed for the sake of money. They are most readily deterred and best punished by levying compensatory and punitive damages on those who would, or did, profit. Tort remedies would also do away with the most unattractive features of strict liability.
[Vol. 73 (6) As noted above, Braithwaite advocates milder punishment of common crimes for two reasons. First, he believes "that utilitarian goals are not being achieved by putting common criminals in prison." Since Braithwaite neither explains which utilitarian goals he has in mindsurely deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation are achieved, or not achieved, to different degrees by incarceration-nor why he has reached his conclusion, I shall simply indicate my belief that appropriately severe, certain and predictable punishment does have deterrent effects sufficient to warrant it2 Hence, I do not think that milder punishment for common crimes is justified. Further, the "community treatment" advocated by Braithwaite is likely to be even less discouraging than Braithwaite believes incarceration is. There is no evidence to indicate that community treatment is rehabilitative either. But if it were, it still would not be useful. 4 Wherefore it could not be recommended on utilitarian grounds.
Braithwaite advocates milder punishment of common crimes for a second reason: the "convergence" of punishments for white-collar and other crimes brought about by milder punishment of the latter would be more equitable, "the only practical way of approaching equity." Indeed "just deserts for the powerless [common criminals] and comparative leniency for the powerful [white-collar criminals] is not just deserts at all . . . [but] a rationalization for ruling class justice."
It seems that Braithwaite here confuses justice with equality. If the present punishment of common crimes is deserved (or deterrent, or both) wherein does it become less deserved (or deterrent) if the punishment of white-collar crimes is less than deserved (or deterrent)? It is an odd moral (or legal?) theory that tells us that if A escapes punishment, or is punished mildly, B too should escape punishment or receive a punishment milder than deserved. It does not matter whether A and B are individuals or groups.
Surely unequal justice, though never as just as equal justice, is more just and therefore better than equal injustice. Is it not better to punish some criminals justly than none?
5 To let some innocents go rather than none?
I disagree not only with Braithwaite's general argument but also with many specific ones; but I shall not take the space to list them.
